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Trading Wind Power in a Competitive Electricity
Market Using Stochastic Programing and
Game Theory
Ting Dai, Student Member, IEEE, and Wei Qiao, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—Wind power is one of the most rapidly growing clean
and renewable energy sources. However, due to the uncertainty
and intermittency of wind power, the increasing penetration of
wind power into the electric power system will pose challenges
to power system operators. Moreover, as a participant in a com-
petitive electricity market, a wind power producer’s behavior
and profit will be influenced by other participants’ behaviors.
This paper proposes a model of using stochastic programming to
generate optimal bidding strategies to maximize the total profits
of wind and conventional power producers in both the energy
market and a bilateral reserve market, where the reserve price is
settled between wind and conventional power producers by using
game theory. Case studies using real-world data for games in an
electricity market with different types of players are performed to
show the effectiveness of the proposed model.
Index Terms—Bidding strategy, electricity market, game theory,
stochastic programming, wind power.
NOMENCLATURE
The most important notations used throughout the paper are
listed below for quick reference.
Indices:
Index of time periods, running from 1 to .
Index of conventional generating units of a power
producer, running from 1 to . for wind
power producers.
Index of scenarios, running from 1 to .
Index of players, running from 1 to .
Decision Variables:
Power offered by a conventional unit in the
day-ahead market for a time period .
Power offered by a conventional unit in the
real-time market for a time period .
Power offered by a conventional unit in the
bilateral reserve settlement for a time period .
Total actual power output of a conventional unit
for a time period .
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Reserve price in a time period .
Power offered by a wind producer in the
day-ahead market for a time period .
Power bidden by a wind producer in the bilateral
reserve market for a time period .
State of a conventional unit in a time period ,
where means ON and means OFF.
Auxiliary variable used to compute the CVaR.
Auxiliary variable used to compute the CVaR in
a scenario.
Random Variables:
Day-ahead market price in a time period .
Real-time price in a time period .
Actual wind power production in a time period .
Ratio between the real-time and day-ahead prices.
Other Variables:
Value at risk at confidential interval.
Conditional value at risk at confidential interval.
Expected profit of a conventional power producer.
Expected profit of a wind power producer.
Total deviation of energy incurred by a wind
producer with respect to the schedule in a time
period .
Positive deviation of wind energy.
Negative deviation of wind energy.
The variables, if augmentedwith a subscript , represent their
realization in a scenario .
Constants and Parameters:
Energy price cap.
Duration of a time period .
Probability of occurrence of a scenario .
Minimum power output of a conventional unit .
Minimum power output of a conventional unit .
Ramp-up rate for a conventional unit .
Ramp-down rate for a conventional unit .
Thermal heat rate curve parameters.
Start-up cost for a conventional unit .
Initial start of a conventional unit .
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Installed capacity of a wind producer.
Per-unit confidence level.
Risk-aversion parameter of conventional power
producers.
Risk-aversion parameter of wind producers.
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE installed capacity of wind power is increasing rapidlyall around the world. The global installed wind capacity
reached 237 GW at the end of 2011 [1]. The United States, Ger-
many, Spain, and China are the leading countries in terms of
installed wind capacity. China saw the largest additions of new
capacity in 2011. According to recent reports [1], [2], the total
installed wind capacity in the U.S. reached over 46 GW with
nearly 5.6 GW of newly installed wind capacity in 2011. Due to
the uncertainty and intermittency of wind power, the increasing
penetration of wind power into electric power systems will pose
challenges to power system operators.
In the United States, around 66% of the installed wind
power was sold through power purchasing agreements (PPAs)
at a fixed price in 2011 [3]. However, since the PPA price
continuously declines after reaching the peak at 2008 and the
availability of PPA contracts has been limited since 2010, wind
power producers can no longer obtain stable revenues through
PPAs. Some of the U.S. and European wind power producers
have committed themselves in a similar way as other market
participants in energy markets and are subjected to monetary
penalties if they deviate from their commitment [3]–[6]. For
example, the Midwest Independent System Operator (MISO),
ERCOT, and New York ISO (NYISO) all allow wind resources
to bid in the day-ahead market. The wind curtailment manage-
ment has been treated in the same way as other conventional
generators in most ISOs or RTOs [4]. For example, in the
MISO’s market, wind and conventional generators will be
curtailed out of the market for transmission congestion and
minimum generation events. The order of the curtailment is
determined based on generators’ impacts on the transmission
constraints and priority of transmission service. In this paper,
wind power producers are treated in the same way as conven-
tional generators in the day-ahead and real-time markets; ISOs
cannot curtail wind power on an involuntary basis.
The uncertainty in wind power generation is a major obstacle
to the natural incorporation of wind producers into a com-
petitive market framework from both technical and economic
perspectives. The question of how wind producers can benefit
from a competitive environment has been raised recently and
several solutions have been proposed. One solution is based
on a combined and coordinated use of wind power and energy
storage technologies [7]–[10], e.g., pumped-hydro storage,
compressed air, etc. However, the availability of utility-scale
storage is still limited. Another solution is using financial
options as a tool for wind producers to hedge against generation
uncertainty [11]. Some papers have also presented using sto-
chastic models to generate optimal bidding strategies for wind
power producers participating in the day-ahead or adjustment
market [12]–[14]. In [15], different offering strategies for wind
producers were evaluated and the results showed that the use of
stochastic models to generate offering strategies outperformed
those generated by using forecasted values of wind power
directly. The reserve market has also been included in some
models to maximize the revenue of wind producers. Liang et al.
[16] proposed a model for wind producers to participate in both
energy and regulation markets to increase revenue and system
security. Coordinated trading of wind and thermal energy
produced by the same producer was studied in [17], where a
two-stage stochastic optimization model was proposed to max-
imize the total profit from both wind power plants and thermal
generators which have high production costs and fast-ramping,
near-zero minimum output power. By transferring the risk from
wind power plants to thermal generators of the producer, the
risk associated with wind uncertainty is mitigated.
The existing work considered only the behavior of wind
power producers. However, as participants in the electricity
market, wind power producers will compete with other con-
ventional power producers. Each market participant bids with
the target of maximizing their own profit. The bidding strategy
of each participant will definitely influence the clearing process
of both energy and reserve markets.
This paper proposes a model that uses stochastic program-
ming to generate optimal bidding strategies to maximize the
profits of wind and conventional power producers from both the
energy market and a new bilateral reserve market. In the pro-
posed model, a new trading mechanism is introduced in which
wind producers are allowed to buy energy from the bilateral re-
serve market to minimize the risk of losing money due to their
production uncertainties; the energy offers and bids in the new
bilateral reserve market as well as the reserve price are settled
among wind and conventional power producers by using game
theory. Case studies for games with different types and num-
bers of wind and conventional power producers are provided to
demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed model.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION METHODOLOGIES
A. Market Framework and Assumptions
Consider a pool-based electricity market in which suppliers,
including wind power producers, submit energy offer curves
into day-ahead energy and reserve markets for each hour of the
next operating day. The time frames for market clearance are il-
lustrated in Fig. 1. In most U.S. markets, the day-ahead energy
and reserve markets are cooptimized by using a single clearing
process determined by the market operators, from which the en-
ergy and reserve transactions coming into effect during each
hour of the next operating day are cleared at a given time of
the current operating day. Once the markets are cleared, the lo-
cation marginal price (LMP), the reserve market clearing price,
and the cleared energy volume of each participant are settled.
Some American markets, e.g., the PJM Interconnection market,
allow generating resources to rebid if they are not selected in
the day-ahead market. This rebidding is not considered in this
paper. For wind power producers, someAmerican markets, e.g.,
the California Independent System Operator (CAISO) market,
allow them to reschedule their output around one hour ahead
(defined as 75 minutes ahead). These specific cases are not dis-
cussed in this paper. Finally, the real-time market is carried
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Fig. 1. Time frames for clearing in an electricity market.
out just minutes before the actual power delivery by producers
to ensure a real-time balance between generation and demand.
This is done by offsetting the difference between the real-time
operation and the corresponding energy program settled in the
day-ahead market [18]. A real-time price is calculated for the
real-time market based on real-time operating conditions. For
each hour, producers are paid for the cleared energy volume at
the day-ahead LMP. While in the real-time market, producers
are paid at the real-time price for positive energy deviations
(i.e., the production in the real-time market is higher than that
scheduled in the day-ahead market) and will pay for negative
energy deviations (i.e., the production in the real-time market
is lower than that scheduled in the day-ahead market). More-
over, the participants who offer reserve are paid for the cleared
reserve volume at the reserve price, while the participants who
buy reserve are charged for the cleared reserve volume at the
reserve price.
Several assumptions are made to simplify the problem for-
mulation. 1) The participants in the electricity market are wind
and conventional power producers. The wind power producers
predict their maximum possible power outputs with errors.
The conventional power producers can control their power
outputs precisely and failures of facilities are not considered
in operation. 2) Wind and other power producers have no
market-power capability in energy markets, which include
the day-ahead and real-time markets. Therefore, the proposed
model cannot be applied to power producers whose bidding
strategies have significant impact on the market clearing price.
3) The introduced bilateral reserve market is mixed with the
system-wide reserve to provide standby power to cover the in-
termittency and uncertainty of nondispatchable sources, which
are wind power in this paper. The bilateral reserve is provided
by conventional power producers and consumed by wind power
producers. 4) The bilateral reserve settlement among wind and
conventional power producers can be seen as a new trading
mechanism for the new type of reserve adding to the existing
system-wide reserve. The bilateral reserve settlement price
and volumes of specific providers are cleared among the wind
power producers and the conventional power producers who
provide this new type of reserve. This new bilateral trading
mechanism does not change current implementation of the
system-wide reserve, regulation, and other auxiliary services
for mitigating other uncertainties (e.g., large load uncertainties)
in the system.
B. Two-Stage Stochastic Optimization Approach
For wind power producers, the uncertainties in obtaining the
maximum profit from both energy and bilateral reserve markets
include wind power output, hourly LMP, real-time price, and
bilateral reserve market clearing price. The problem of maxi-
mizing the total profit of a wind power producer can be formu-
lated using constrained mixed-integer stochastic programming,
where the uncertainties in optimization are handled through a
two-stage decision-making process. The decisions in the first
stage are here-and-now decisions, which are made before the re-
alization of the stochastic process. The decisions in the second
stage are wait-and-see decisions, which are affected by those in
the first stage. If the stochastic process is represented by a set
of possible scenarios, second-stage decision variables are then
defined for each single scenario considered [18].
In this study, the stochastic process for a wind power producer
involves the following:
1) Design the offer strategy for the day-ahead energy and
bilateral reserve markets and submit the resulting energy selling
offers and reserve bidding offers to the market operator for
each period of the market horizon. In this stage, decisions are
made based on a plausible realization of the stochastic process,
namely, the day-ahead and real-time energy prices and wind
power production. The bilateral reserve price is determined by
using game theory, which is described in Section II-C.
2) The second-stage decisions are made for a given realized
scenario, where the day-ahead market price, the real-time price,
and the wind energy produced become known. Therefore, the
payment or cost of wind power producers in the real-time
market can be calculated.
The approach for conventional power producers is similar to
that for wind power producers. The only difference is that the
production of a conventional power producer can be controlled
and, therefore, is not considered as a stochastic process.
C. Auction Games and Nash Equilibrium
A game is a “formal representation of a situation in which
a number of individuals interact in a setting of strategic inde-
pendence [19].” There are four elements in a game [20]: 1) the
players, 2) the rules of the game, 3) the outcomes, and 4) the
payoff and preference (utility functions) of the players. A game
can be either cooperative, where the players collaborate to
achieve a common goal, or noncooperative, where they act on
their own.
In this paper, different energy suppliers are the game players.
Each player has the historical information of other players’ past
actions. A strategy is a rule that tells the players which action(s)
they should take. Assuming that the players are noncooperative,
know the payoff functions of other players, and try to maximize
their payoff functions while considering their rivals’ bidding
strategies, the Nash Equilibrium [19] will occur when no player
will have the incentive to change its offering/bidding strategy.
In order to benefit from participating in the bilateral reserve
market, wind producers will not buy reserve from the bilateral
reserve market if the reserve clearing price exceeds the real-
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time price while the conventional power producers will not offer
reserve in the bilateral reserve market if the real-time price is
lower than the day-ahead price. This means that the offer price
for reserve at a certain time can take any value between the
day-ahead price and the higher value between the real-time
price and the energy price cap specified by the market
operator
(1)
A wind power producer can bid reserve energy provided by con-
ventional power producers at any value between zero and the
predicted imbalance power during the market operation
(2)
Also, a conventional power producer can offer reserve energy
of its unit to a wind power producer at any value between zero
and the maximum power output of this unit
(3)
Let denote player ’s strategy and denote other
players’ strategies. Player ’s total profit is , which includes
the revenue from both energy and bilateral reserve markets and
can be obtained by solving a two-stage stochastic programming
problem described in Section III.
Let be the set of continuous strategies of player . For a
continuous game, a strategy tuple is a Nash Equi-
librium if the following equilibrium condition is satisfied [20]
for all continuous strategies s, where :
(4)
The continuous equilibriums are difficult to obtain because the
payoff function has no explicit formula. To simplify the solu-
tion process, the continuous strategy set of player , , is appro-
priately discretized into choices; then the set of the resulting
discrete strategies of player can be written as ,
. Since a player has generating units
and each unit can have discrete strategies, can be ex-
pressed as . Moreover, since there are totally
players, a game can then be formed with a total number of
strategy tuples. The Nash solution can
then be searched among the strategy tuples. Similar to (4),
is a Nash Equilibrium for the matrix game if the
following discrete equilibrium condition is satisfied:
(5)
III. MATHEMATICAL FORMULATION
A. Scenario Generation and Reduction
In stochastic programming, stochastic processes can be rep-
resented using continuous or discrete random variables. In the
best case, stochastic programming problems with continuous
random variables can only be solved in small or illustrative in-
stances [18]. For this reason, scenario representation of random
Fig. 2. Typical scenario tree.
variables becomes indispensable in solving stochastic problems.
The set of values used to model a random variable is usually ar-
ranged in a so-called scenario tree, as illustrated in Fig. 2. A
scenario tree comprises a set of nodes and arcs. The node in the
first stage is called the root node. The nodes in the last stage are
called leaves. A scenario is a path from the root to the leaf. A
stage is a moment in the time line when the decisions are taken.
Different techniques have been proposed in the literature to
build scenario trees. Given that the computational burden of
a stochastic programming problem increases rapidly with the
number of scenarios, a mathematical tool aimed at scenario re-
duction becomes necessary. In this paper, a procedure com-
bining a path-based method [13] and a scenario reduction tech-
nique [21] is used to generate a two-stage scenario trees. A
seasonal autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA)
model [13] is used to generate a large number of scenarios of
wind power, day-ahead price, and real-time price predictions.
Then, a fast-forward scenario-reduction algorithm [21] is used
to obtain a reduced scenario set with a sufficiently small number
of scenarios from an iterative process. In each iteration, the sce-
nario that minimized the Kantorovich distance between the re-
duced set and the original set is selected from the set of unse-
lected scenarios and included in the reduced set. The algorithm
stops if either the required number of scenarios or a certain Kan-
torovich distance is attained.
B. Mechanism for Real-Time Prices
As described in Section II-A, the real-time market, i.e., the
balancing market, deals with the difference between the energy
produced during the real-time operation and the energy sched-
uled in the day-ahead market. In some U.S. electricity markets,
e.g., the PJM market, the actual quantity deviation from the
scheduled hourly quantity in the day-ahead market is priced in
the real-time market. Define / to be the ratio be-
tween the real-time and day-ahead prices. The mechanism for
real-time prices can be explained as follows:
1) If a player’s day-ahead scheduled power is less than the
actual power that can be generated in the real-time market and
the real-time price excesses the day-ahead price, which means
, this player will have incentive to sell extra power into
the real-time market and will be paid at the real-time price for
the extra power.
2) If a player’s day-ahead scheduled power is greater than the
actual power generated in the real-time market, which means
, this player will have to pay for the deviation power at
the real-time price.
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3) When the power system’s demand is deficit, ; other-
wise, when the power system’s generation is more than demand,
.
C. Conventional Power Producers
The conventional power producers, such as thermal and
hydro power plants, can control their power outputs if no
generator failure is considered. The problem of obtaining the
best bidding strategy for conventional power producers is
formulated as a two-stage stochastic program to maximize the
profit of a thermal power producer is
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
where the objective function (6) comprises two terms: 1) the
expected profit, which equals the revenues from the day-ahead,
real-time, and bilateral reserve markets minus the produc-
tion cost and start-up cost; and 2) the CVaR multiplied by a
weighting factor , which allows controlling the risk-aversion
degree of the conventional power producer [22].
In this model, the first-stage decision variable is the hourly
bid of the energy volume of the thermal units while the
second-stage decision variable is the real-time output
of the thermal units. Constraints (7)–(9) bound the maximum
power capacity of each thermal unit. The actual total power
generated by each thermal unit is expressed in Constraint (10).
Constraints (11) and (12) represent the ramp-up and ramp-down
limits of each thermal unit, respectively. The production cost
of each thermal unit is expressed as a quadratic constraint
(13). Constraint (14) enforces a nondecreasing offer curve.
Constraint (15) constitutes the nonanticipativity conditions
related to the decisions made in first stage. Constraints (16) and
(17) are used to compute CVaR.
Risk control is an important issue when formulating a sto-
chastic programming model. VaR has been used to quantify a
portfolio exposure to risk [23]. is the VaR at a certain
confidence level and equals to the largest value of ensuring
that the probability of obtaining a profit less than is lower than
. In this work, the is the upper bound of the profit
for the least profitable scenarios [17]. A serious
shortcoming of using VaR is that it does not reflect any informa-
tion about the profits of the scenarios beyond the value of VaR.
Moreover, it is difficult to handle VaR when the profits are not
normally distributed [22].
CVaR, which has been proven to have better performance
than VaR [22], is used in this work as a risk measurement.
is computed as the expected value of the profit asso-
ciated with the worst scenarios. The value of
in (6) is usually chosen to be around 0.95 [15], [17], [18]. The
weighting parameter is set by the producers to indicate their
degree of willingness to take risks. A higher value of indi-
cates that the producers are more risk averse, which results in a
higher value of CVaR and a lower value of the expected profit.
Therefore, the value of is chosen as a tradeoff between ex-
pected profit and risk.
The model to maximize the profit of a hydro power producer
is similar to that of the thermal power producer, except that the
fuel cost is set to be zero and the ramp-up and ramp-down con-
straints (11) and (12) are ignored.
D. Wind Power Producers
The model to maximize the profit of a wind producer is
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
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(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
where the objective function also comprises two terms: 1) the
expected profit, which equals the revenue from the day-ahead
market plus the revenue from positive energy deviations in the
real-time market minus the cost for negative energy deviations
in the real-time market and the cost in the bilateral reserve
market; and 2) the CVaR multiplied by a weighting factor ,
which controls the risk-aversion degree of the wind producer.
Again in this model, the first-stage decision variable is the
hourly bid of the energy volume of the wind producer
while the second-stage variables are the real-time energy devia-
tions and of the wind producer. Constraint (19) limits
the amount of wind energy that can be traded in the day-ahead
market. Constraints (20)–(23) determine the total positive and
negative energy deviations incurred by the wind producer per
period and scenario. Constraint (24) constitutes the nonanticipa-
tivity conditions related to the decisionsmade in first stage. Con-
straint (25) enforces a nondecreasing offer curve. Constraints
(26) and (27) are used to compute CVaR.
The two models of conventional and wind power producers
are connected through the reserve volumes and and the
reserve clearing price in the bilateral reserve market. The
total reserve volume (i.e., the sum of reserve volumes ) of
conventional power producers should be equal to .
E. Solving Matrix Games
The discretization of the strategy variables s may cause loss
or artificial creation of Nash Equilibrium as discussed in [20]. To
capture a possibly missing Nash solution, the standard discrete
equilibrium condition (5) is loosened by to yield an approxi-
mate Nash Equilibrium
(28)
The matrix payoffs are suppliers’ profits from both energy
and bilateral reserve markets. These profits are obtained by
solving the two-stage constrained stochastic programming
problems described in Sections III-C and III-D for all strategy
tuples in the increasing order of bidding price and energy. After
the payoffs for each strategy tuple are obtained, the strategy
tuples are examined for the Nash Equilibrium condition (28).
Reference [20] presented a method to find an appropriate value
of for determining an approximate Nash Equilibrium.
The complete solution process for trading wind power in
both energy and bilateral reserve markets is depicted in a
flowchart in Fig. 3, which consists of two parts: obtaining the
matrix payoffs by stochastic programming on the left-hand
Fig. 3. Flowchart for trading wind power using the proposed model.
side and solving for the Nash Equilibrium on the right-hand
side. In this paper, strategies are generated for each wind power
producer and each unit of conventional power producers. The
strategies contain two variables: the reserve energy volume
or that a conventional generating unit would like to offer
or a wind producer would like to buy, respectively, and the
reserve clearing price settled among conventional and wind
power producers. These variables are discreated separately
into a limited number of values within their limits defined by
(1)–(3). A strategy tuple is then created by combining a value
of these variables of all the players in the game. For each
strategy tuple, the stochastic optimization models (6)–(17)
and (18)–(27) are executed for conventional and wind power
producers, respectively, during which (or ) and
are constant values in this strategy tuple. Then the Nash Equi-
librium condition is examined for each solved strategy tuple
to determine which strategy tuple yields the maximum profits
for both conventional and wind power producers. Finally,
the stochastic programming is executed for the best strategy
tuple (i.e., the Nash Equilibrium) to obtain the optimal bidding
curve. The parameter is relatively small compared to the
expected profit obtained from the stochastic models, e.g., 1%
of the expected profit. If no solution is obtained from the search
for the Nash Equilibrium, wind producers will not bid reserve
and conventional power producers will not offer reserve in the
new bilateral reserve market.
Compare to the work of [17], in this paper the trading be-
tween wind and thermal energy is not regulated by the owners
but by profit. The trading will happen only if the transaction is
beneficial to both producers. The profits of different producers
are maximized separately. Moreover, game theory is applied in
this paper to determine the reserve trading volume and price be-
tween conventional and wind power producers.
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TABLE I
THERMAL UNIT DATA
IV. CASE STUDY
Case studies for games with different numbers of players are
carried out to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed
model. In each case the proposed model is compared with the
traditional model which does not have the market for trading the
new type of reserve. Therefore, the traditional model is obtained
by setting the reserve price as well as the offering and bidding
reserve capacities to zero in the objective functions (6) and (18).
In the traditional model, there are no transactions between wind
power producers and conventional power producers in the bilat-
eral reservemarket and, therefore, no game theory is used. All of
the cases are simulated using CPLEX 12.1 in GAMS [24]. The
computer used for simulation studies has a 3.16-GHz, 4-core
CPU and a 16-GB RAM.
A. Two-Player Game
Consider a game with two players: one thermal power plant
with three units and one wind power plant. The installed capaci-
ties of the wind and thermal power plants are 100 and 140 MW,
respectively. Since there is only one thermal power producer
in the market of providing the new type of bilateral reserve,
the wind producer decides how much reserve it would like to
buy from the thermal power producer and at what price, while
the thermal power producer decides the price of the reserved
power and how much reserve it would like to sell. The thermal
units’ operating characteristics are given in Table I. The re-
serve price bid cap is $1000/MWh in the reserve market.
The ARIMA model is used to generate 5000 scenarios for wind
power, day-ahead price, and real-time price predictions, respec-
tively. Scenario reduction is then performed to reduce the sce-
narios of wind power, day-ahead price, and real-time price pre-
dictions to 5 each. Therefore, the final reduced scenario tree has
125 scenarios. The wind plant data is obtained from the National
Renewable Energy Laboratory website [25]. The energy prices,
including both the day-ahead price and real-time price, are ob-
tained from the PJM website [26]. The risk-aversion parameter
is . The confidence level is . The
maximum approximation parameter (see Fig. 3) is $10.
For each thermal unit, three discrete reserve power volumes and
three reserve clearing prices are generated. Assume that the re-
serve clearing price strategies are identical for the three units.
Totally 81 strategy tuples are generated in this case study. The
bidding curve for the wind producer is generated by solving the
two-stage stochastic optimization problem (6)–(27), where the
Fig. 4. Case 1: real-time, day-ahead, and settled reserve prices.
Fig. 5. Case 1: expected profits of the wind power producer.
wind generation, real-time price, and day-ahead price are ob-
tained through forecasting and scenario generation and reduc-
tion, while the reserve price settled between wind and conven-
tional power producers is obtained by using the game theory.
The expected profit is then calculated by applying the bidding
curve obtained into the electricity market using real data ob-
tained from the PJM market.
1) Case 1: Real-Time Price Is Lower Than Day-Ahead Price:
A day is selected in which the real-time price has a low stan-
dard deviation, and during some hours the real-time price is
lower than the day-ahead price. The real-time and day-ahead
prices obtained from the PJM market and the reserve price set-
tled between wind and conventional power producers obtained
from the proposed model are shown in Fig. 4. The total ex-
pected profits of the wind producer to gain from participating
in the energy market only and from participating in both the en-
ergy and bilateral reserve markets are shown in Fig. 5. The in-
creased profit of the wind producer from playing a gamewith the
thermal power producer in the bilateral reserve market to buy
reserve energy is shown in Fig. 6. The energy market bidding
curves of the wind producer participating in the energy market
only and in both the energy and bilateral reserve markets for the
7th and 24th hours are shown in Fig. 7.
In this case, when the real-time price is lower than the day-
ahead price, the thermal units would rather sell power in the
day-ahead market than the bilateral reserve market. The reserve
price is then set to zero since there is no transaction of reserve
in the bilateral reserve market. During hours when the real-time
price is higher than the day-ahead price, the reserve price is
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Fig. 6. Case 1: increased profit of the wind power producer from participating
in both the energy and bilateral reserve markets.
Fig. 7. Case 1: energy market bidding curves of the wind producer generated
for the 7th and 24th hour.
settled between the real-time price and day-ahead price. Thus,
the wind producer could buy cheaper energy from the bilateral
reserve market to gain a higher profit, as shown in Figs. 5 and
6. Buying energy from the bilateral reserve market has changed
the wind bidding curve, as illustrated in Fig. 7. Compared to
the case that the wind producer only participates in the energy
market, if the wind producer participates in both the energy and
bilateral reserve markets, it will bid at a higher price for low
capacities and then decline its price to bid at a lower price for
high capacities in the energy market. Moreover, the maximum
capacity and price that the wind producer wishes to bid in the
energy market are higher than those if it only participates in
the energy market. These observations are expected as the wind
producer tends to first bid a higher price to cover the cost it will
spend to buy reserve power and then to make more profit by
selling more power.
2) Case 2: Real-Time PriceHas aHighMean Value and Stan-
dard Deviation: In this case, a day is chosen in which the mean
value and standard deviation of the real-time price is high. This
means that the real-time price is more difficult to predict for
market participants. The real-time price, day-ahead price, and
settled reserve price are shown in Fig. 8. The total expected
profits of the wind producer to gain from participating in the
energy market and from participating in both the energy and bi-
lateral reserve markets are shown in Fig. 9. The increased profit
of the wind producer from buying reserve energy is shown in
Fig. 8. Case 2: real-time, day-ahead, and settled reserve prices.
Fig. 9. Case 2: expected profits of the wind power producer.
Fig. 10. Case 2: increase profit of the wind power producer from participating
in both energy and bilateral reserve markets.
Fig. 10. The energy market bidding curves of the wind producer
in participating in the energy market only and in both the en-
ergy and bilateral reserve markets for the 18th and 19th hour
are shown in Fig. 11.
In this case, playing a game in the bilateral reserve market to
buy reserve energy will not always benefit the wind power pro-
ducer. In Fig. 8, the reserve price in the 19th hour is even higher
than the real-time price. Due to an inaccurate forecasting of the
real-time price, the wind producer buys expensive power from
the bilateral reserve market, which results in a lower (negative)
expected profit in that hour compared to the case that the wind
producer does not participate in the bilateral reserve market, as
shown in Fig. 10. However, during most times the wind pro-
ducer gains more profit from playing the game in the bilateral
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Fig. 11. Case 2: energy market bidding curves of the wind producer generated
for the 18th and 19th hour.
reserve market. The bidding curves in the 18th and 19th hour in
Fig. 11 show the same features as in Fig. 7.
The mean values of the increased profit of the wind power
producer by playing the game in the bilateral reserve market
are $22.5 in Case 1 and $244.8 in Case 2. A higher real-time
price results in more profit increase. The reserve price also has
a tight correlation with the real-time price and depends more
on the fluctuations of the real-time price. A highly fluctuated
real-time price is more difficult to predict, which increases the
risk of losing money for the wind producer in the joint energy
and bilateral reserve markets.
B. Case 3: A Multiplayer Game With Multiple Types of
Conventional Power Producers
Based on the two-player game, a multiplayer game is consid-
ered with an additional hydro power producer. The hydro power
producer has three hydro units with a total capacity of 200 MW.
As in Cases 1 and 2, the total number of scenarios in this case
study is reduced to 125. However, the number of strategy tuples
increases to 81 . Obviously, the computational time increases
with the number of players. Effective strategy tuple reduction
can be used to reduce the computational time. For example,
the number of strategy tuples can be significantly reduced by
only generating strategies for each player instead of for each
unit. Then the total number of strategy tuples for this case is
only 81. In a practical electricity market with many players,
only those with fast-ramping output power capability are likely
to provide reserve for wind producers and, therefore, need to
be considered in the game. Moreover, since each strategy tuple
can be examined separately, the proposed model and solution
process can be implemented easily and efficiently using parallel
computing techniques. This, combined with efficient scenario
and strategy tuple reduction and player selection, will make the
proposed model applicable to practical electricity markets with
many players.
The hydro units’ characteristics are given in Table II. It is
assumed that the hydro units have sufficient source from the
reservoir to generate electricity. The real-time, day-ahead, and
settled reserve prices are shown in Fig. 12. The total expected
profits of the wind producer to gain from participating in the
TABLE II
HYDRO UNIT DATA
Fig. 12. Case 3: real-time, day-ahead, and settled reserve prices.
Fig. 13. Case 3: expected profits of the wind power producer.
Fig. 14. Case 3: increased profit of the wind power producer from participating
in both the energy and bilateral reserve markets.
energy market only and from participating in both the energy
and bilateral reserve markets are compared in Fig. 13. The in-
creased profit of the wind power producer from playing a game
with other producers in the bilateral reserve market is shown
in Fig. 14. The energy market bidding curves of the wind pro-
ducer in participating in the energy market only and in both the
energy and bilateral reserve markets for the 18th and 19th hour
814 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, VOL. 4, NO. 3, JULY 2013
Fig. 15. Case 3: energy market bidding curves of the wind producer generated
for the 18th and 19th hour.
Fig. 16. Expected profits of the thermal units for Cases 2 and 3.
are shown in Fig. 15. The profits of the thermal power producer
for Cases 2 and 3 are compared in Fig. 16.
By including the hydro units into the game, the mean value
of the reserve price obtained from playing the game during the
24 hours decreases from $106.17 in Case 2 to $96.83 in this
case. Consequently, the mean value of the expected profit of the
wind producer during that day increases from $4544.8 in Case
2 to $4729.8 in this case because of the decrease of the reserve
price. The participation of the hydro units into the market in-
creases competition, which results in a lower reserve price and
more wind power bidden into the energy market. The bidding
curves in Fig. 15 show the same trend as in Fig. 7. Moreover,
compared with Fig. 11, the bidding curves of the wind producer
when participating in both the energy and bilateral reserve mar-
kets in Fig. 15 have higher maximum bidding price and bidding
capacity.
Fig. 16 clearly shows the influence of the participation of the
hydro units on the expected profit of the thermal power pro-
ducer. Compared to Case 2, the lower reserve price and the in-
creased competition to sell reserve to the wind producer result
in a decrease of the profit of the thermal power producer in Case
3. The mean value of the expected profit of the thermal units in
Case 3 decreased by 22% with respect to that in Case 2. On the
contrary, comparing Figs. 9 and 13, due to the participation of
Fig. 17. Expected profit and CVaR for the wind power producer for different
and for Case 2.
the hydro units, the mean expected profit of the wind producer
in Case 3 increased by 9.7% with respect to that in Case 2.
C. Impact of Risk Management
In the previous cases, both and are chosen to be 0.5.
To study the impact of risk aversion, the expected profit of the
wind producer and the CVaR for different are calculated
for Case 2, where changes from 0 to 0.9 with an interval of
0.1. The influence of of the thermal units is also considered.
Three curves are plotted in Fig. 17 for to be 0.1, 0.5, and
0.9, respectively, where each curve represents the relationship
among the expected profit of the wind producer, CVaR, and .
As shown in Fig. 17, the three curves have the same trend:
when increases, the value of CVaR increases but the ex-
pected profit decreases. In the case of , the CVaR in-
creased by approximately 43% while the expected profit only
reduced by 1.7% when increases from 0 to 0.9. When
increases but remains constant, both the expected profit and
CVaR increase. This is expected. Since when increases, the
thermal units are willing to take less risk by selling more reserve
to the wind producer, which increases the expected profit of the
wind producer.
The impact of the risk-aversion parameters for Cases 1 and 3
is similar to that of Case 2.
V. CONCLUSION
The uncertainty in production is the major obstacle for wind
power producers to compete with conventional power producers
in a competitive electricity market. A joint energy and bilat-
eral reserve market model for trading wind power has been pro-
posed in this paper to help wind power producers deal with their
production uncertainties. In the proposed model, stochastic pro-
gramming has been applied to generate optimal bidding strate-
gies to obtain the maximum expected profits for wind producers
in the energy market. Game theory has been applied to take con-
sideration of the uncertainty of other participants’ behaviors in
a market for trading a new type of reserve settled among wind
and conventional power producers. The reserve price is then
settled by solving Nash Equilibrium. During normal hours, the
expected reserve price is settled between the day-ahead price
and real-time price. Wind producers will benefit from buying
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cheaper reserve power to reduce or avoid higher real-time penal-
ties as well as to reduce the cost for negative energy deviations
in the real-time market. More participants in the new bilateral
reserve market will increase the competition and, therefore, de-
crease the reserve price. Wind producers can benefit more from
the bilateral reserve market with diversified reserve suppliers.
Case studies using real-world market data have shown that the
proposed model is effective for wind producers to actively par-
ticipate in a competitive electricity market to maximize their
profits.
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